Where is the categorical imperative

Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time.

For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses.

A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty.

He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men like the South Sea islanders should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct.

For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.

Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as be can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress! But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature.

For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires. These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law.

This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we should will that it should be so. In others this intrinsic impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, since such a will would contradict itself It is easily seen that the former violate strict or rigorous inflexible duty; the latter only laxer meritorious duty.

Thus it has been completely shown how all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation not the object of the action on the same principle. If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the contrary, we will that the opposite should remain a universal law, only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favor or just for this time only in favor of our inclination.

Consequently if we considered all cases from one and the same point of view, namely, that of reason, we should find a contradiction in our own will, namely, that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be universal, but admit of exceptions.

As however we at one moment regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason, and then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclination, there is not really any contradiction, but an antagonism of inclination to the precept of reason, whereby the universality of the principle is changed into a mere generality, so that the practical principle of reason shall meet the maxim half way.

Now, although this cannot be justified in our own impartial judgement, yet it proves that we do really recognize the validity of the categorical imperative and with all respect for it only allow ourselves a few exceptions, which we think unimportant and forced from us.

We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a conception which is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical and not at all in hypothetical imperatives.

We have also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all. Kant, I. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals T. Reason has a lot of functions. It has a theoretical function science, for example and a practical function. We are interested in the practical function -- practical in the sense that reason determines along with emotions and desires human behavior and choice.

But the practical function can be understood to have two parts -- as a "means-ends" function, and as the moral function. Kant, as it should be clear to you by now, does not equate moral reason with the calculative reason of the utilitarians or the egoists. But he does not condemn this side of practical reason, either.

It has its proper place in human life, and it is an exceedingly important place. But calculation of means and ends must be supported with a different type of reasoning -- moral reasoning.

And how does this side of human reasoning work? What is it's nature? Human reason is principally constituted by the search for universality and necessity. This conception of reason shows Kant to be deeply and profoundly influenced by the Enlightenment, and the Enlightenment's pursuit of natural science. For Kant, this search for "natural laws" in science is the crucial aspect, the constitutive element of rationality per se.

And just as the discovery of universal laws is absolutely central to natural science, so is the search for universal laws central to human morality. It is this aspect of reason which is at the heart of the demand for impartiality and justice. No, we want the Judge to be rational -- to put aside those personal attachments which might influence his or her ability to ignore such things as the color of your skin, or the shape of your body, or the spelling of your name, or the patterns of your clothing, or the length of your hair.

What matters is the law. What matters is the Judge's unbiased reason. So it is in ethics as it is in law. The Categorical Imperative is devised by Kant to provide a formulation by which we can apply our human reason to determine the right, the rational thing to do -- that is our duty. For Kant the basis for a Theory of the Good lies in the intention or the will. Those acts are morally praiseworthy that are done out of a sense of duty rather than for the consequences that are expected, particularly the consequences to self.

That will is to do our DUTY. What is our duty? It is our duty to act in such a manner that we would want everyone else to act in a similar manner in similar circumstances towards all other people.

Kant expressed this as the Categorical Imperative. Act according to the maxim that you would wish all other rational people to follow, as if it were a universal law. Kant argues that there can be four formulations of this principle:.

The Formula of the Law of Nature: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature. The Formula of the End Itself: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.

The Formula of Autonomy: "So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxims. The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: "So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends.

Never treat a person as a means to an end. Persons are always ends in themselves. We must never use or exploit anyone for whatever purpose. Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason wanted to find a basis for ethics that would be based on reason and not on a faith in a god or in some cold calculation of utility that might permit people to be used for the benefit of the majority.

Kant thought carefully about what it is that all humans would find reasonable as a guide for human conduct. People think it wrong to kill, lie, steal, and break promises. Why is this so. Kant arrives at the idea that humans think these acts wrong because they cannot will that others would do these things because it would mean the end of civilized life, perhaps even the life of the actor contemplating the right way to behave.

One can not will that people lie all the time for that would mean the end to human communications if we could not trust what was said to be true most, if not all, of the time. Kant thought that there would be perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect Duty is that which we are all obliged to do all of the time. Imperfect Duties are those which we should do as often as possible but can not be expected to do always. With the Golden rule you are to: Act as you would have others act towards you.

The Golden Rule Around the World. The same essential golden rule has been taught by all the major religions and philosophies of the world going back approximately years. Do not to others what ye do not wish done to yourself The Mahabarata, cited in Das, , p. Human nature is good only when it does not do unto another whatever is not good for its own self. Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful. Udanavargu, , Tibetan Dhammapada, What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor; that is the entire Torah; the rest is commentary; go learn it.

Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a, as cited in Glatzer, , p. In happiness and suffering, in joy and grief,. Yoga-Sastra, cited in Bull, , p. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.

Luke So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you. Matthew Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself. Confucius, Analects, , ; Mahabharara, ,. ISLAM c. No one of you is a believer until you desire for another that which you desire for yourself.

The Sunnah from the Hadith , publ. Be not estranged from another for, in every heart, Pervades the Lord.